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ABSTRACT
In this paper, we study the initial recruitment of individuals in the political
sector. We propose an equilibrium model of political recruitment by a party who
faces competition for political talent from the lobbying sector. We show that a
political party may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians, in
spite of the fact that it could aﬀord to recruit better individuals who would like
to become politicians. We argue that this ﬁnding may contribute to explain
the observation that in many countries the political class is mostly composed of
mediocre people. (JEL: D72, J44, J45; Keywords: politicians, parties, political
recruitment.)
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<merloa@econ.upenn.edu>.“ W e ’ da l ll i k et ov o t ef o rt h eb e s tm a n ,b u th ei sn e v e rac a n d i d a t e . ”
—F. McKinney Hubbard.
1 Introduction
The quality of politicians has long been an issue of great concern in all democracies. A
widespread sentiment summarized by the opening quote above is that politicians are typically
not the best a country has to oﬀer. At the same time, however, it is also fair to say that they
are not the worst either. Anecdotal evidence from around the world abounds. The current
President of the United States was a “C student” at Yale University. Nevertheless he has
an Ivy League college degree. Göran Persson (the former Prime Minister of Sweden) is not
a college graduate. Nevertheless, he successfully completed all but a few credits to earn a
social science degree at Örebro University. Pedro Miguel de Santana Lopes (the former Prime
Minister of Portugal) was a sports commentator. John Major (a former Prime Minister of
the U.K.) was a clerk in an insurance brokerage ﬁrm. These are all examples of politicians
in some of the highest elected oﬃces in their countries. In addition, there are thousands of
lesser political oﬃces everywhere that are occupied by “average Joes and Janes.” In sum, it
seems that in many diﬀerent countries the political class is for the most part composed of
mediocre people. We refer to this observation, which represents the focus of our work, as
mediocracy.1
In this paper, we provide a possible explanation for this phenomenon by focusing on
the initial recruitment of individuals in the political sector. In most countries, relatively few
individuals start oﬀ their political careers by running for a public oﬃce. More frequently, they
ﬁrst test their political aspirations by holding positions within party organizations, which
represent “breeding grounds” from which the vast majority of elected oﬃcials come from.
The role of party service (i.e., holding a regular, paid job within a party organization), as
an essential qualiﬁcation for pursuing a political career, is especially important in countries
with a strong party system, such as, for example, Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, the
1A c c o r d i n gt ot h eWebster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English language, mediocracy is
deﬁned as: “rule by the mediocre.” For a discussion of the origin of the term and its relevance for politics
see, e.g., Tribe (1975).
1Netherlands, Sweden, and the U.K. (see, e.g., Best and Cotta (2000) and Norris (1997)).2
Hence, the individuals who are recruited by political parties to work in the political sector
determine the quality of the pool of potential candidates for public oﬃce.3 We argue that
parties may deliberately choose to recruit only mediocre politicians.
We consider a situation where a political party, who has to recruit new politicians, faces
competition for “political talent” from lobbying ﬁrms.4 The political and the lobbying sector
of an economy are in fact intimately related. The lobbying sector provides fund-raising
opportunities to politicians who in turn justify the very existence of the lobbying sector.
Since lobbyists have to deal with politicians, political skills are also valued by lobbying
ﬁrms, and wages in the lobbying sector aﬀect the recruiting decisions of a political party.
At the same time, since to deal with skilled politicians requires skilled lobbyists, the party’s
recruiting decisions aﬀect the output of the lobbying sector, and hence the wages in the
sector. These two aspects of the relationship between the political sector and the lobbying
sector are at the heart of our analysis.
Another important aspect of the environment we consider is that people who are poten-
tially interested in becoming politicians typically begin their involvement in politics by en-
2For example, according to Norris and Lovenduski (1995), in the 1992 British general election, about 95%
of Labour candidates and 90% of Conservative candidates had held a full-time position within the party.
Rydon (1986) and Cotta (1979) suggest similar levels of party involvement among members of parliament
in Australia and in Italy, respectively. In other countries, like for example, Canada, Finland, and the U.S.,
party service is not necessarily a pre-requisite for advancement in political careers. Even in these countries,
however, the fraction of party professionals in the political sector has grown considerably over the years (e.g.,
Norris (1997)).
3“Competitive democratic elections oﬀer citizens a choice of alternative parties, governments and policies.
[...] Which candidates get on the ballot, and therefore who enters legislative oﬃce, depends on the prior
recruitment process. [...] In most countries recruitment usually occurs within political parties, inﬂuenced by
party organizations, rules and culture.” Norris (1997, pp. 1-14).
4Here, we ignore inter-party competition and consider an environment where there is only one political
party. In general, inter-party competition for potential politicians is likely to be of secondary importance, as
ideological preferences are more likely to draw individuals toward speciﬁc parties. In fact, the lack of within-
sector competition for sector-speciﬁc skills is a striking feature of the political sector, which diﬀerentiates it
from many other economic sectors.
2gaging in a variety of voluntary, unpaid political activities that are organized and monitored
by political parties (e.g., student political organizations, campaign teams, party internships).
These activities thus provide opportunities for a political party to observe the political skills
of individuals it may be potentially interested in recruiting. While these opportunities may
not be readily available to the lobbying sector, lobbying ﬁrms can nevertheless make an
inference about the political skills of individuals from the party’s recruiting decisions. This
information externality also represents an important component of our analysis.
We incorporate these basic considerations into a simple equilibrium model of political
recruitment by a party. Potential recruits are heterogeneous with respect to their political
skills, and can either enter the political sector and work for the party or work as lobbyists in
a perfectly competitive lobbying sector.5 The beneﬁt to the political party from recruiting
a new politician, which, for example, may be measured by the funds the politician raises on
behalf of the party, increases with the political skills of the new recruit, which are known by
the party. Political skills are also valuable in the lobbying sector, where the productivity of
a lobbyist depends on his skills relative to those of the politicians he has to interact with.
The political skills of individuals, however, are not directly observable by lobbying ﬁrms.
The objective of the party is to maximize total rents, given by the diﬀerence between
the funds raised by its recruits and the wages it has to pay them, where each party recruit
has to raise at least enough funds to cover his salary. Equilibrium wages in the political
sector are determined by the outside option available to individuals to work in the perfectly
competitive lobbying sector, where they are paid based on their expected productivity as
lobbyists. Since the party knows the political skills of individuals, and lobbying ﬁrms can
only make a partial inference based on the party’s recruiting decisions, the labor market in
the lobbying sector is characterized by two wages, depending on whether or not an individual
h a sb e e nr e c r u i t e db yt h ep a r t y .T h i si m p l i e st h a tt h el a b o rm a r k e ti nt h ep o l i t i c a ls e c t o ri s
characterized by a single wage.
We characterize the party’s equilibrium selection rule, which determines the quality of the
politicians the party recruits. We ﬁnd that in equilibrium the party only recruits mediocre
5In most modern democracies, while the number of political parties is typically small, the number of
lobbying ﬁrms runs into thousands.
3politicians: that is, the party pursues neither the very best prospects, nor the ones with
the lowest political skills, both of whom end up working as lobbyists. The intuition for this
result is that the equilibrium selection rule used by the party conveys useful information to
the lobbying sector about the productivity of party recruits. This aﬀects the equilibrium
wage the party has to pay to its recruits. Politicians with relatively higher skills increase
the party’s wage and hence make all party recruits more expensive. This equilibrium eﬀect
f o r c e st h ep a r t yt of o r e g ot h eo p p o r t u n i t yo fr e c r u i t i n gt h ev e r yb e s tp o l i t i c i a n s . A tt h e
same time, it makes individuals with relatively low political skills too expensive compared to
the relatively low beneﬁts they generate for the party, thus making it not worthwhile for the
party to recruit individuals at the bottom of the distribution of political skills. This result
holds in spite of the fact that in principle the party could aﬀord to recruit individuals of all
skill levels, including the very best, and these individuals would prefer to become politicians.
We also ﬁnd that an increase in the productivity of political skills in the lobbying sector
relative to the political sector decreases the political skills of the best politician, and makes
the party more homogenous with respect to the political skills of its recruits. However, the
average quality of the party’s recruits and the equilibrium wage paid by the party may either
increase or decrease.
Our paper is related to the literature on the endogenous selection of politicians (see,
e.g., the survey by Besley (2005)). The two approaches that are prevalent in this literature
are based on the “political-agency” framework and the “citizen-candidate” framework. The
political-agency framework focuses on the extent to which voters can discipline elected repre-
sentatives with career concerns in environments with moral hazard and/or adverse selection
(e.g., Banks and Sundaram (1993, 1998), Barro (1973), Besley (2006), Ferejohn (1986) and
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (1997)). The citizen-candidate framework (e.g., Besley and
Coate (1997) and Osborne and Slivinski (1996)), removes the artiﬁcial distinction between
citizens and politicians, by recognizing that public oﬃcials are selected by the citizenry from
those citizens who choose to become politicians and stand as candidates in an election in
the ﬁrst place. In particular, Caselli and Morelli (2004) and Messner and Polborn (2004)
consider citizen-candidate models where in equilibrium low-quality individuals may be more
likely to run for oﬃce than high-quality ones. In their models, the value of the outside
4opportunities of high-quality individuals exceed the rewards from oﬃce, thus discouraging
them from running for public oﬃce.6 This literature, however, abstracts from the role of
parties in the selection of politicians.
Our paper is also related to the literature on political parties. Most of the recent literature
on parties has tried to “unbundle” these institutions by focusing on speciﬁc purposes parties
serve, thus providing alternative, complementary rationales for their existence (see, e.g., the
survey by Merlo (2006)). These purposes include the mobilization of voters (e.g., Herrera
and Martinelli (2006) and Shachar and Nalebuﬀ (1999)), the choice of policy platforms (e.g.,
Levy (2004), Morelli (2004) and Testa (2004)), and the selection of electoral candidates (e.g.,
Caillaud and Tirole (2002), Carrillo and Mariotti (2001), Mattozzi and Merlo (2005) and
Snyder and Ting (2002)).7 None of these contributions, however, studies the issue of political
recruitment.8
Finally, our work relates to the literature on the optimal allocation of talent in an economy
(see, e.g., Baumol (1990) and Murphy, Shleifer and Vishny (1991)). This literature studies
the eﬀects of incentives on the occupational choice of entrepreneurs, and the aggregate im-
plications of the allocation of entrepreneurial talent between productive and unproductive
(e.g., rent-seeking) activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present the model,
and in Section 3 the results of our analysis. We conclude with Section 4.
6The equilibrium mechanisms in the two models are, however, diﬀerent. In Caselli and Morelli (2004), bad
politicians generate a negative externality for good ones, by reducing the prestige associated with holding
oﬃce, and hence the overall rewards from oﬃce. This generates the possibility of multiple equilibria in
quality. In Messner and Polborn (2004), as long as the salary of elected oﬃc i a l si sr e l a t i v e l yl o w ,h i g h -
quality individuals free-ride on low-quality ones by not running and letting them run instead.
7Other functions performed by parties include the organization and coordination of electoral campaigns
(e.g., Osborne and Tourky (2004)), the formation of bargaining coalitions in the legislature (e.g., Jackson
and Moselle (2002)), and disciplining the behavior of elected representatives (e.g., Alesina and Spear (1988)
and Harrington (1992))
8There is also a recent empirical literature that studies the careers of politicians. Diermeier, Keane and
Merlo (2005) estimate a dynamic model of the career decisions of the members of the U.S. Congress. Dal
Bo, Dal Bo and Snyder (2006) provide an empirical study of the self-perpetuation of political elites in the
U.S.
52T h e M o d e l
There is a continuum of individuals of measure one who are potentially interested in
becoming politicians. The political sector is characterized by a single political party who
wants to recruit politicians. There is also a perfectly competitive lobbying sector where a
large number of identical ﬁrms want to hire lobbyists.
Individuals are heterogenous with respect to their political skills p ∈ [0,1],w h i c ha r e
uniformly distributed in the population of potential politicians.9 Each individual knows his
own political skills, which are also known by the party, but not by the lobbying ﬁrms. The
population distribution of political skills is common knowledge. Political skills are productive
in both occupations, with relatively more skilled individuals being more productive in each
occupation.
If an individual with political skills p joins the political party, he generates beneﬁts
f (p) for the party, where f (·) is a strictly increasing and concave fund-raising technology,
with f (0) = 0. We assume that when making its recruiting decisions, the objective of the
political party is to maximize total rents, given by the diﬀerence between the funds raised
by its recruits and the wages it has to pay, where each politician has to raise at least enough
funds to cover his salary. When deciding whom to recruit the political party takes into
account that potential recruits could also work as lobbyists. The competition the political
party faces from the lobbying sector determines the (endogenous) wage it has to pay to its
recruits.
The lobbying sector is perfectly competitive, and we let r ∈ (0,f(1)) denote the rental
price of political skills in the sector.10 Since lobbyists have to interact with politicians, we
assume that an individual is productive as a lobbyist only to the extent that his political
skills are at least as high as those of politicians. Hence, if political skills where observable
by lobbying ﬁrms, a lobbyist with political skills p would receive a wage rp if p ≥ pl and
0 otherwise (where pl denotes the skill level of the worst politician, which is determined in
9The uniformity assumption is made here purely for expositional convenience. Mediocracy would also
arise in a model with a general distribution for political skills.
10Equivalently, we may think of the lobbying sector as being characterized by an aggregate, constant
returns technology, and r is equal to the marginal product of political skills in the lobbying sector.
6equilibrium).11 The restriction r<f(1) guarantees that in principle the party can aﬀord to
recruit politicians of all skill levels, including the very best.12
Lobbying ﬁrms, however, do not directly observe the political skills of individuals. Nev-
ertheless, the party’s recruiting decisions convey some information about the political skills
of its recruits. In particular, potential employers in the lobbying sector can use the party’s
recruiting strategy to form expectations about the skills of the party’s recruits. Hence, lob-
bying ﬁrms can condition their wage oﬀers to whether or not an individual is being recruited
by the party as a politician.
At the heart of the model described here there are two externalities. The ﬁrst is an
externality that the party’s recruiting decisions impose on the lobbying sector, induced by
the fact that to deal with skilled politicians lobbying ﬁrms need skilled lobbyists. The second
is an externality that goes in the opposite direction, from the wages in the lobbying sector
to the party’s recruiting decisions, generated by the fact that potential party recruits may
ﬁnd alternative employment opportunities in the lobbying sector.
3R e s u l t s
An equilibrium of the model described in Section 2 consists of an allocation of individuals
to occupations and a wage schedule for each occupation such that the individuals, the party,
and the lobbying ﬁrms are behaving optimally, and the “political labor market” clears. In
particular, we restrict attention to situations where, in equilibrium, both the political and
the lobbying sector are non-empty (i.e., the party recruits a positive measure of politicians
and the remaining individuals work as lobbyists).
We provide necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the parameters of the model for exis-
tence of an equilibrium. We show that if an equilibrium exists it is unique and is a mediocracy
equilibrium: the party successfully recruits individuals with political skills in the interval
[pl,p h], 0 <p l <p h < 1, while individuals with political skills p ∈ [0,p l)∪(ph,1] work in the
11This assumption captures the idea that an eﬀective lobbyist cannot be “dumber” than the “dumbest”
politician.
12If r>f(1), then the choice of the party not to recruit individuals with the highest political skills would
be a direct consequence of the assumption.
7lobbying sector.13 In equilibrium, the average quality of politicians may be either higher or
lower than the average quality of lobbyists. Moreover, the higher the rental price of political
skills in the lobbying sector (i.e., the higher r), the more homogeneous the party (i.e., the
smaller the interval [pl,p h]), and the lower the quality of the most skilled politician (i.e., the
lower ph). On the other hand, the quality of the worst politician, pl,a n dt h ea v e r a g eq u a l i t y
of politicians, (pl + ph)/2, may either increase or decrease with r.
Before we characterize the equilibrium, we begin by describing its main features. Suppose
that the party tries to recruit only individuals with political skills p ∈ [pl,p h] ⊆ [0,1].S i n c e
potential employers in the lobbying sector can use the party’s recruiting strategy to form
expectations about the skills of the party’s recruits, the lobbying sector will therefore oﬀer
two wages depending on whether or not individuals are being recruited by the party. Let























2(1− (ph − pl))
¶
. (2)
Note that as long as pl > 0, individuals with political skills p<p l who are not being
recruited by the party are not productive in the lobbying sector. However, as long as ph < 1,
the lobbying ﬁrms do not know who these individuals are.
In order to be successful in its attempt to recruit individuals with political skills p ∈
[pl,p h], the party must therefore oﬀer these individuals a wage of at least win, which rep-
resents their outside option in the lobbying sector. Since the outside option is the same for
all such individuals, the wage the party will oﬀer to all its potential recruits is then exactly
equal to win. Furthermore, since each politician must generate a non-negative rent for the
party, it has to be the case that f (pl) ≥ win. Total rent maximization by the party implies
that f (pl)=win. It follows that the maximization problem of the political party can be
13Throughout the analysis, we rule out the possibility of “atoms” in the skill distribution of politicians
and lobbyists. In particular, the set of politicians and the set of lobbyists must each be a ﬁnite union of






(f (p) − win)dp (3)
s.t. f (pl)=win.




f (pl) − pl ≥ pl. (4)




(f (p) − win)dp > 0
if and only if pl > 0, which also implies that ph >p l and win > 0. Next, note that it must
also be that ph < 1. Otherwise, if ph =1 , the only individuals who are not being recruited
by the party have political skills p ∈ [0,p l), and are therefore not productive in the lobbying
sector. It follows from (2) that in this case wout =0 , and hence no ﬁrm would operate in the
lobbying sector. Finally, since all politicians are paid the same by the party, strict concavity
of f (p) implies that the party will only try to recruit those individuals whose political skills
are in the interval [pl,p h].
The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium.
Proposition 1: There exist r and r such that a unique equilibrium exists if and only if
r ∈ (r,r]. In equilibrium, the party recruits politicians with skills p ∈ [pl,p h], 0 <p l <p h <





rf (pl) − pl,
(f (ph) − f (pl))p0
h (pl)=f0 (pl)(ph − pl).










2(1− (ph − pl))
¶
= wL.
The proof of Proposition 1 is contained in the Appendix. In equilibrium, the party chooses
not to hire the best potential politicians because of the eﬀe c tt h a th i r i n gt h e mg e n e r a t e so n
9the wage the party has to pay to all its recruits. Also, the party does not hire the worst
potential politicians because they would not raise enough funds for the party to justify their
salary. The party recruit with the lowest quality generates zero rents for the party (i.e.,
he raises as much funds for the party as the salary the party has to pay him). The rents
generated by all other party recruits are positive and increasing in their political skills. The
quality of the best party recruit is determined by an indiﬀerence condition that equalizes the
increase in the party’s total rents he generates to the increase he induces in the salary the
party has to pay to all its recruits.
The bounds on r that guarantee existence of an equilibrium are explained by the following
considerations. The rental price of political skills in the lobbying sector measures the extent
of the competition the party faces for political talent, and hence the strength of the wage
externality the lobbying sector imposes on the party. If r is too low, the presence of the
lobbying sector has a negligible eﬀect on the party’s recruiting decisions. In particular, the
wage externality generated from recruiting the best possible politicians (i.e., individuals with
political skills p =1 ), would not be large enough to discourage the party from pursuing them,
and only individuals with relatively low political skills would be willing to accept employment
in the lobbying sector. However, since these individuals would not be productive as lobbyists,
the lobbying sector would remain empty. If, on the other hand, the party is facing ﬁerce
competition from the lobbying sector for its potential recruits (i.e., r is too high), the party
would only be willing to recruit politicians with very low quality, and pay them a wage that
is lower than the one paid by the lobbying sector. Hence, nobody would be willing to become
a politician, and the party would remain empty. In fact, in equilibrium, it must be the case
that politicians who are recruited by the party earn no less than individuals who accept
employment in the lobbying sector. If this were not the case, then people would be better
oﬀ by hiding their political skills from the party.
If we let µP and µL denote the average skills of politicians and lobbyists, respectively, we



























2(1− (ph − pl))
,
where pl and ph are characterized in Proposition 1. Hence, µP ≥ µL if and only if pl ≥ 1−ph,
or µP ≥ 1/2. Whether or not the average quality of party recruits is higher than the average
quality of all potential politicians depends on the fund-raising technology f (·) as well as the
rental price of political skills in the lobbying sector r.
The next proposition establishes three equilibrium comparative statics results.
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The proof of Proposition 2 is also contained in the Appendix. Result (i) follows immedi-
ately from a “revealed proﬁtability” argument. Since the net marginal rent generated by the
party recruit with the highest quality ph is equal to zero in equilibrium (i.e., the increase in
the party’s total rents directly generated by ph is equal to the rent reduction caused by the
indirect eﬀect of recruiting ph on the party’s wage wP), if the externality becomes stronger
(i.e., if r increases), an individual with quality ph would no longer be a desirable party recruit.
To interpret result (ii) it is useful to note that, since in equilibrium wP = f (pl),t h e
quality of the worst party recruit pl is weakly increasing in r if and only if the salary paid
by the party weakly increases when the wage externality from the lobbying sector becomes
stronger. An increase in r has three eﬀects on the party’s marginal rents, that correspond
to the three terms in the expression






The ﬁrst two eﬀects are a direct consequence of the revealed proﬁtability argument illustrated
above: since the individual with quality ph is no longer desirable, the party saves the cost
of recruiting him, wP,b u tl o s e st h er e n t sh ew a sg e n e r a t i n g ,f (ph) − wP.T h et h i r de ﬀect
is the marginal cost of adjusting the size and composition of the party following an increase
in the wage externality. This “recruiting adjustment cost” is equal to the marginal cost of
recruiting, wP, times the marginal rate at which the party is willing to substitute politicians
with high quality with low quality ones, p0
h (pl)f0 (ph)/f0 (pl),w h e r ep0
h (pl) reﬂects the fact
11that pl and ph are linked in equilibrium. If the combined eﬀect of an increase in r on the
party’s marginal rents is positive, then it is optimal for the party to increase its salary to
“hold on” to relatively skilled individuals, which entails an increase in the quality of the
worst party recruit. If, on the other hand, the combined eﬀect is negative, then it is optimal
for the party to lower its salary and replace relatively skilled politicians with unskilled ones.
In this case, an equilibrium reinforcement eﬀect results in a larger drop in the quality of the
best party recruit than in the quality of the worst one (result (iii)).
An immediate implication of results (i) and (iii) in Proposition 2 is that as r increases
the party becomes more homogeneous with respect to the quality of its recruits (i.e., ph −pl
decreases). Also, the average quality of party recruits µP can either increase or decrease
with r.C l e a r l y , i f dpl/dr ≤ 0, then the average quality decreases. On the other hand,
when dpl/dr > 0, it may either decrease or increase depending on the relative desirability
of skilled politicians. In general, the equilibrium relationship between µP and r depends on
the fund-raising technology f (·).
To illustrate some of the results, consider the following parametric example. Let the








1 − β + βp if p>
1−β
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In the table below, we let α =1 .1 and r =0 .98, and we report the equilibrium values of
pl, ph,a n dµP and their comparative statics with respect to r f o rf o u rd i ﬀerent parameter
values for β.
12β =0 .1 β =0 .5 β =0 .8 β =0 .95
pl 0.76 0.72 0.62 0.37
ph 0.94 0.90 0.78 0.47






dr + −− −
By holding α constant, diﬀe r e n tv a l u e so fβ correspond to diﬀerent situations with respect
to the relative productivity of politicians with diﬀerent levels of political skills from the
point of view of the party. When β is relatively small, politicians with relatively high skills
(i.e. individuals with political skills p>(1 − β)/(α − β)), are very similar with respect to
the amount of funds they raise for the party. As β increases, diﬀerences in their relative
productivity increases. Hence, when for example β =0 .1,e v e ni fa ni n c r e a s ei nr makes
the individual with skills ph no longer desirable as a party recruit (because of the revealed
proﬁtability argument explained above), an individual with quality slightly below ph is almost
as good as ph with respect to the funds he raises for the party, and at the same time has
as m a l l e re ﬀect on the party’s wage. As a consequence, even though it is optimal for the
party to lower its standards with respect to the quality of its best recruits, the party has a
strong incentive to still recruit relatively skilled politicians, while becoming necessarily more
choosy with respect to individuals with relatively low skills, thus increasing the quality of its
worst recruits. Overall, this results in an increase in the equilibrium average quality of the
politicians the party recruits. As β gets larger, the incentives for the party to continue to
pursue potential recruits with relatively high political skills following an increase in r become
weaker, and the equilibrium average quality of its recruits start to decrease. Eventually (e.g.,
when β =0 .8), the party also lowers its standards with respect to the quality of its worst
recruits. Also note that, unlike in the other cases, when β =0 .95, the equilibrium average
q u a l i t yo ft h ep a r t y ’ sr e c r u i t si sl o w e rt h a nt h ea v e r a g eq u a l i t yo fl o b b y i s t s ,a n dh e n c el o w e r
than the average quality of all potential politicians.
134 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have focused on the recruiting of politicians by political parties, which
plays an important role in shaping the political class in many advanced democracies. We have
proposed a simple model of political recruitment where in equilibrium a party deliberately
chooses to recruit only mediocre politicians, in spite of the fact that the party could aﬀord
to recruit the best political talent available. We argue that this may in part explain the
observation that in many countries politicians are typically not “the cream of the crop.” Our
analysis has highlighted several important aspects of the relationship between the political
sector and the lobbying sector that may contribute to the emergence of mediocracy.
Our analysis generates a number of interesting implications that are potentially testable.
For example, an implication of our framework is that entry level wages in the lobbying sector
should not be higher than those of party professionals at a comparable stage of their careers.
A careful empirical investigation of this issue would require individual level data on the earn-
ings of party professionals and lobbyists in several countries with strong party organizations,
and is beyond the scope of this paper.14 Nevertheless, casual observations provide at least
some suggestive evidence that supports our claim. Italy, for example, is a country with a
strong party system, where the political arena is dominated by party professionals, and the
lobbying sector is predominantly characterized by trade union organizations. In Italy, the
average monthly earnings of a party oﬃcial (i.e., “funzionario di partito”) and a union oﬃcial
(“sindacalista”) are equal to about 5,000 and 3,000 Euros, respectively.15 Similarly in the
U.K., which is another country where political recruitment by parties determines to a large
extent the pool of politicians, the average annual starting salaries of a lobbyist and a party
professional are about 18,000 and 24,000 Pounds, respectively.16
14Unfortunately, such data are currently unavailable, even at the aggregate level, and collecting this
information would provide a very useful resource for empirical research in this area.
15These amounts refer to party and union oﬃcials at the national level. At the regional level, the two
amounts are comparable, and are equal to about 2,000 Euros per month. We obtained this information by
conducting a phone survey of party and union organizations in Italy. Similar ﬁgures can be obtained from
the (publicly available) budgets of several parties and unions, by dividing their total wage costs net of the
wages of secretaries and staﬀ,b yt h en u m b e ro fo ﬃcials they employ.
16These ﬁgures were obtained from job postings available online at www.prospects.ac.uk, the U.K.’s oﬃcial
14Another interesting implication of our analysis is that the average quality of politicians
may either increase or decrease with the level of competition the political sector faces from the
lobbying sector for political talent, depending on the shape of the fund-raising technology in
the political sector. This ﬁnding suggests that the estimation of the “production functions”
of the political and the lobbying sector of a country may convey important information
about the quality of its political class and the industrial organization of politics. We intend
to pursue this line of research in future work.
Appendix




f (pl) − pl =1 ,
and existence and uniqueness of pl follow from ph (0) = 0, ph (1) > 1,a n dp00
h (pl) < 0.
Moreover, limr→0 pl =0 ,a n dlimr→f(1) pl = b pl ∈ (0,1]. Second, by using (1) and (2), we have
that win = wP ≥ wL = wout if and only if
pl (1 + pl) ≥ 1 − ph (pl),















which is increasing in r. By using (3) and (4), it follows that an equilibrium is fully charac-






(f (p) − f (pl))dp, (5)
and by taking the ﬁrst order condition we get
(f (ph) − f (pl))p
0
h (pl) − f
0 (pl)(ph − pl)=0 . (6)
graduate careers website.
15Since concavity of f (·) implies that
f
0 (pl) >




a solution to (6) exists only if p0
h (pl) > 1,a n dp0
h (pl) <f 0 (pl)/f0 (ph). To see that (6) is












00 (pl)(f (ph) − rph). (7)
The last term of (7) is negative since f (·) is concave, and f (ph) − rph > 0 (recall that








h (pl) − 1), (8)
we have that p0
h (pl) <f 0 (pl)/f0 (ph) implies that (8) is decreasing in p0










h (pl) − 1) <f
0 (ph) − f
0 (pl) < 0,
where the last inequality follows from concavity of f (·). The fact that when (6) holds (7) is
negative, implies that if a solution to (6) exists it must be unique. Therefore, if a mediocracy
equilibrium exists, it is unique and completely characterized by (4) and (6). Necessary and
suﬃcient conditions for existence are:
(f (1) − f (pl))p
0
h (pl) − f





































0 (pl) − 1,















16Finally, since pl is a function of r, we need to show that r = Q(pl) admits a solution.
Otherwise, an equilibrium would never exist. Since pl is increasing in r, Q(pl)−r is decreasing
in r,a n d
lim
r→0Q(pl) − r =
2f0 (0)f (1)
f0 (0) + f (1)
> 0,










− f (1) < 0.












− f (1) = f
0 (1) − f (1) < 0,
where we used the fact that
lim
r→f(1)


















Q(pl) if limr→f(1) (Q(pl) − r) < 0
R ≥ f (1) otherwise,
concludes the proof. ¥













2 + f0 (pl)(2p0
h(pl) − 1) − 2
























(i) also follows. ¥
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